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With the digitization of society, crime has also digitized. 
Digitization has consequences for the entire spectrum 
of crime and raises all sorts of questions. For example, 
are we dealing with a new type of offender, or with the 
same old offenders who simply moved their activities 
online? How can potential victims be made resilient 
against attacks? And who should protect potential 
victims: the police, commercial cybersecurity companies, 
or internet service providers? 
To date, many of these questions remain unanswered. 
This is partly because current studies have a strong focus 
on technology or are exploratory in nature, suffer from 
methodological limitations and focus on just a few of the 
many types of cybercrime.
The aim of this research agenda is to stimulate research 
on the human factor in cybercrime and cybersecurity. 
The agenda provides the state-of-the-art of research on 
the role of the human factor in this fi eld. In addition, 
examples are given of important research questions and 
innovative methods and datasets that are needed for 
future studies. This agenda can be seen as a foundation 
for further thought with disciplines, inside and outside the 
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CYBER AND OTHER SPACE RESEARCH: THE BIGGER PICTURE
Space research in antiquity can be characterized as mono- 
disciplinary research: astronomers in Mesopotamia observed 
and recorded the position, brightness and movement of the 
sun, moon, planets and stars. Their field of vision was  heavenly 
and they recorded everything down on earth on clay tablets. 
Thanks to applications of IT research we can now peruse the 
work of researchers from that time. Nowadays, there are 
many freeware planetarium programs, sky maps and astrol-
ogy apps in circulation, which you can use to reproduce and 
view a starry sky 33 AD. The field of vision of modern astron-
omers is considerably broader than that of their ancestors. 
Space research nowadays is impossible without IT research.
Cyberspace research actually began under the name informa-
tion security, as a mono-disciplinary direction within IT. Mean-
while, the field of vision of the cybersecurity research commu-
nity  greatly expanded into the darkest ends of the world-wide 
web. This research is not possible without the contributions 
of the humanities and social sciences. Criminologists, lawyers, 
economists and ethicists can make an outstanding contribu-
tion to the broad spectrum of cybersecurity research.
The cybersecurity research community is justifiably  increasing 
its attention to the human factor and the socio-technical 
side, such as social engineering. The Dutch Cybersecurity 
Platform for Higher Education and Research – dcypher – a 
public-private agenda- setting platform, is committed to con-
necting the brand new NWO domains of Sciences (ENW), 
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Applied and  Engineering Sciences (TTW) and Social Sciences 
and  Humanities (SGW) in the area of cybersecurity research 
to one another. In the past several calls for cybersecurity 
research proposals were organized and funded by various 
NWO science departments. As a framework for these calls, 
successive editions of the multidisciplinary domain – and top 
sector crosscutting National Cyber Security Research Agenda 
(NCSRA) were used.
The research agenda “The Human Factor in Cybercrime and 
Cybersecurity” deserves to be executed. The team of authors 
 preparing a new edition of the NCSRA, under coordination of 
 dcypher, will definitely use this agenda as input. In particular, 
Chapter 8 provides attractive challenges. Field consultations 
for the NCSRA III will take place at the end of 2017. I whole-
heartedly welcome the participation of all human factor 










Our society is highly digitized. On a typical day,  people use 
various information technology (IT) applications. The Nether-
lands is at the top of many lists related to IT use. The majority 
of the Dutch population, for example, has access to the inter-
net (89% of households in 2015) and uses it every day in one 
way or another. IT is no longer solely used to communicate 
or to find information. In 2015, three quarters of the Dutch 
population was active on a social network, 77 percent used 
online banking and 10.1 million individuals shopped online 
(CBS, 2016). Furthermore, in 2015, virtually all companies had 
a broadband internet connection, 90 percent had their own 
website, 74 percent provided their staff with laptops, tablets 
or smartphones, and 28 percent used cloud services to store 
information. Finally, the Netherlands plays an important role 
in the infrastructure of the internet. In December 2015, an 
important internet exchange hub, the Amsterdam Internet 
Exchange (AMS-IX) processed 864 thousand terabytes of data 
traffic (CBS, 2016).
With the digitization of society, crime has also digitized. On 
the one hand, there are new offenses, such as hacking data-
bases and taking down websites or networks. On the other 
hand, there are traditional forms of crime in which IT plays 
an increasingly important role in its realization. Examples 
are internet fraud and cyberstalking. Digitization has conse- 





of questions. For example, are we dealing with the same 
old offenders who have moved their activities online, or is 
there a new type of offender with the same characteristics 
and motives? Which personal and situational  characteristics 
 provide an increased or decreased risk of cybercrime victimi-
zation? And who should protect potential victims: the police, 
commercial cybersecurity companies, or internet  service pro-
viders (ISPs) and hosting providers?
The fact that digitization brings new risks is widely recognized. 
Thanks to funds for cybercrime and cybersecurity research, 
more and more scientific research is being conducted in this 
field. Examples include funding programs from NWO and 
SBIR (the Netherlands), EPSRC (United Kingdom), NordForsk 
(Nordic countries) and NSF (USA). These funding programs 
call for multidisciplinary research and  emphasize that techni-
cal as well as human aspects are of interest. However, most of 
the studies conducted within these  programs have a strong 
focus on technology, for  example, on developing tools and 
techniques to detect or stop  incidents. In order to stimulate 
non-technological research, the research agenda “The Human 
Factor in Cybercrime and Cyber security” has been developed. 
Research on the human factor in cybercrime and cybersecu-
rity is necessary to take the step from stopping incidents to 








The aim of this research agenda is to stimulate research on 
the human factor in cybercrime and  cybersecurity. The human 
factor in cybercrime and cybersecurity includes offenders, 
victims and actors who play a role in  tackling crime. In this 
agenda, researchers in the field of  non-technological research 
into cybercrime and cyber security jointly provide the state-
of-the-art of research on the role of the human factor in this 
research field. In addition, examples are given of important 
research questions and innovative research methods and 
datasets that are needed for future research on the human 
factor in cybercrime and cybersecurity.
For the development of this research agenda, experts in the 
field of non-technological research on cybercrime and cyber-
security have been the focus of consultations. This does not 
imply that technical sciences are not needed to answer the 
research questions outlined in this agenda. That  different 
disciplines are needed to study and understand cybercrime 
and cybersecurity is not in doubt. This research agenda can 
be seen as a foundation for further thought with disciplines, 
inside and outside the social sciences, about how the for-






The Netherlands Institute for the Study of Crime and Law 
Enforcement (NSCR) was the initiator of this research agenda. 
The NSCR worked closely with researchers associated with 
research groups from nine universities, four universities of 
applied sciences, and organizations such as the Scientific 
Research and Documentation Centre (WODC) of the Ministry 
of Security and Justice, Statistic Netherlands (CBS), TNO, 
the Dutch National Cyber Security Center (NCSC), the Dutch 
National Police, the Dutch Public Prosecution Service, the 
Dutch Probation Service and the Netherlands Council for the 
Judiciary. A total of 46 people from 26 organizations contrib-
uted to this research agenda (see Annex 1 and 2).
In total, 22 researchers and practitioners co-authored one or 
more of the three themes in this research agenda: offend-
ers, victims and tackling crime. For each theme, these authors 
provided a state-of-the-art of research into the human fac-
tor in cybercrime and cybersecurity. In addition, important 
research topics and research question were identified. See 
Annex 1 for the list of authors. The results of this exercise 
were used as input for three discussion sessions. Forty-six 
people attended these sessions (see Annex 1 and Annex 2). 
During the discussion sessions, the results of the literature 
reviews were discussed (i.e., is this a good representation of 
the theme? Are these the most important topics within this 
theme?) Participants also discussed important research top-
ics, relevant research questions and possibilities for the use 
of innovative data sources and research methods. Therefore, 










Cybersecurity, cybercrime, e-crime, high-tech crime, digi-
tized crime. There are many terms used to describe crimes or 
incidents in which IT is the target or where IT plays a major 
role in the realization of the offense. When it comes to crim-
inological research into crime and IT, in general, two types 
of crimes are distinguished: “new” types of crimes that are 
aimed at IT and committed through the use of IT (e.g., hack-
ing), and “traditional” crimes that are not focused on IT, but 
where IT is a substantial facilitating factor for committing 
the offense (e.g., fraud via the internet) (e.g., Holt & Bossler, 
2014; McGuire & Dowling, 2013). Depending on the type of 
attack, cybersecurity incidents fall within one of these cate-
gories. In this research agenda, the term “cyber-dependent 
crimes” is used for those within the former category and 
“cyber- enabled crimes” for the latter category. “Cybercrime” 
is used as an umbrella term for both categories.
Various forms of cybercrime can be identified. Cyber-depend-
ent crimes, for example, include crimes such as hacking, creat-
ing botnets, infecting computers with malware and crippling 
IT systems using DDoS attacks. Cyber-enabled crimes include 
various traditional crimes such as fraud, threats and stalking. 
Sometimes crimes fall within both categories. For example, 
hacking to steal sensitive information from a company in order 
to extort that company or the use of malware to intercept 
login credentials of users of online bank accounts in order 




when the term “cybercrime” is used in this research agenda, 
it could therefore be about different types of crimes. For 
future studies into cybercrime, it is important to recognize 
this and to take into account the different types of cyber-
crimes and the characteristics related to them. The motives 
– and, therefore, choices of offenders and opportunities for 
intervention related to motivations – are quite different, for 
example, for an individual hacker who hacks for recognition, 
for a script kiddie who typically uses tools created by others 
without overseeing the consequences of their actions, and 
for traditional organized crime groups which hire IT special-
ists to commit cyberattacks. However, to aid readability, the 
term cybercrime is used throughout this document.
This research agenda is divided into three themes: offenders 
(individuals and networks), victims and tackling cybercrime.
When it comes to offenders, topics such as the characteristics 
of individual offenders, their criminal careers and the social 
and psychological processes that play a role in the develop-
ment of offending, are of importance. Furthermore, with 
regard to criminal networks, opportunity structures, business 
models, the use of facilitators and the use of the dark web 
to purchase and sell criminal tools and services are relevant. 
Chapter 4 of this research agenda covers individual cyber-
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With respect to victims it is, for example, relevant to gain 
insight into how users can be made more resilient against 
cyber-attacks, which characteristics of victims and their behav-
ior both on- and offline makes them more or less attractive to 
cybercriminals, and what the impact of cybercrime on victims 
and society is. Chapter 6 discusses this topic in depth.
All kinds of parties play a role in tackling cybercrime. Relevant 
questions here concern the role end users can play, the role 
and responsibilities parties such as ISPs and social media plat-
forms have, and whether the police are able to perform their 








Marleen Weulen Kranenbarg, André van der Laan, 
Christianne de Poot, Maite Verhoeven,  
Wytske van der Wagen, Gijs Weijters
There is little insight into the nature and extent of cyber-
crime offending. Based on official criminal justice figures, it is 
estimated that less than 0.01 percent of young people in the 
Netherlands are cybercrime offenders. Estimates based on 
survey research range from 5 percent to 22 percent (Bossler 
& Burrus, 2011; Holt et al., 2010a; Van der Laan & Goudriaan, 
2016; Zebel et al., 2013). Further, a study into the use of IT in 
traditional crimes shows that in 41 percent of fraud cases and 
16 percent of threat cases, IT is used to commit these crimes 
(Montoya, Junger & Hartel, 2013). With the ongoing digiti-
zation of our society, it is to be expected that IT will play an 
important role in the commissioning of more and more tradi-
tional crimes.
The question is whether traditional data and methods, such 
as criminal justice figures and victim surveys, can be used to 
get a good picture of cybercrime offenders (Hargreaves & 
Prince, 2013; Holt & Bossler, 2016; Van der Laan & Goudriaan, 
2016; Zebel et al., 2013). More advanced methods, like text 
mining and data mining, can be used to make better use of 
traditional sources, while online sources, for example, social 
media platforms or online forums, can also be used (see, for 




There is no clear picture of the nature and extent of cyber-
crime offending. With the ongoing digitization, it is also 
important to gain insight into the importance of the digital 
component within different types of cyber-dependent crimes 
and cyber-enabled crimes. Further, research is needed into 
how offenders of different types of cybercrime can be meas-
ured in a reliable way. Can traditional methods like surveys 
and police records still be used, which changes are needed 
and what are the possibilities of new online data sources and 
advanced data collection methods?
Are we dealing with a new type of offender, or with tradi-
tional offenders on new turf? There are some studies that 
suggest that cybercrime offenders have the same demograph-
ics as traditional offenders. Cybercriminals, for example, are 
more likely to be men (Bachmann & Corzine, 2010; Hollinger, 
1993; Li, 2008; Randazzo et al., 2005, UNODC, 2013) and more 
likely to be young (UNODC, 2013; Yar, 2005). However, it has 
also been suggested that they differ in ethnicity (Bachmann 
& Corzine, 2010; Li, 2008; Rogers, 2001; Skinner & Fream, 
1997), they may even be younger than traditional offend-
ers (Leukfeldt & Stol, 2012), and that age is related to their 
degree of technical skills (Fotinger & Ziegler, 2004; Van der 
Laan & Goudriaan, 2016). Finally, suspects in Dutch internet 
fraud cases are more likely to have a Dutch nationality when 
compared to traditional fraud cases (respectively, 96% and 
72%) (Montoya et al., 2013).
Studies into characteristics, such as socioeconomic status, mar-
ital status, education, income and intelligence, suggest that 
some types of cybercrime offenders have different charac-
teristics than traditional offenders (Aransiola & Asindemade, 
2011; Bachmann & Corzine, 2010; Chiesa et al., 2008; Fotinger 
& Ziegler, 2004; Holt et al., 2012; Leukfeldt et al., 2010; Leuk-
feldt & Stol, 2012; Moon et al., 2010;  Randazzo et al., 2005; 
Demographic characteristics
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Schell & Melnychuk, 2011; Turgeman-Goldschmidt, 2011a). 
Dietrich et al. (2016) show that cybercrime offenders are 
more likely to be higher educated than offenders of tradi-
tional crimes. However, the possibility of purchasing cyber-
criminal tools on forums enables a larger group of less edu-
cated offenders to go down the path of cybercrime (UNODC, 
2013).
Overall, there is a lack of empirical research into the char-
acteristics of cybercrime offenders. It is not known, for 
example, whether cybercriminals have different character-
istics than traditional offenders, and it is not known if and 
how offender characteristics interact with the motives for 
and execution of certain cybercrimes. Research is needed 
into the characteristics of offenders engaged in various 
forms of cybercrime (cyber-dependent crimes as well as 
cyber- enabled crimes). Traditional methods such as offender 
interviews have hardly been used to gain more insight. In 
addition, criminal meeting places on the darkweb offer new 
opportunities to recruit a new type of respondent or to con-
duct observational research.
Low self-control seems to be related to cybercrime offending 
(Donner et al., 2014; Holt et al., 2012; Hu et al., 2013; Kerstens 
& Jansen, 2016; Marcum, et al., 2014; Moon et al., 2010, 2013). 
Interestingly, however, the more  technical cybercrimes in par-
ticular require a lot of knowledge, patience and planning, 
which would indicate high self- control (Bachmann, 2010; Holt 
& Bossler, 2014; Holt & Kilger, 2008; Willison, 2006). Other 
psychological characteristics related to cybercrime offend-
ers are high online disinhibition or moral disengagement 
(Kerstens & Jansen, 2016; Young et al., 2007), abnormal moral 
development (Gordon & Ma, 2003), narcissism (Woo, 2003) 
introversion (Schell & Melnychuk, 2011), being manipulative 
(Rogers, 2001; Rogers, Smoak, & Liu, 2006), autism (Harvey 
Personality, self-control and interaction effects
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et al., 2016), lack of empathy, anxiety and computer addic-
tion (Schell & Melnychuk, 2011). These characteristics differ 
between types of cybercrime (Rogers et al., 2006; Seigfried & 
Treadway, 2014).
There is no systematic empirical research on the psycholog-
ical characteristics of cybercrime offenders engaged in the 
various types of offenses (cyber-dependent crimes as well as 
cyber-enabled crimes). The studies that have been done have 
severe limitations and focus on a limited number of offenses. 
Therefore, we lack insight into psychological  characteristics 
related to cybercrime offending.
The influence of friends and social learning through friends 
is much studied for cybercrime. Generally, a relationship 
can be seen between deviant behavior of friends and one’s 
own behavior (Hollinger, 1993; Hutchings & Clayton, 2016; 
Marcum et al., 2014; Morris, 2011; Rogers, 2001). However, 
this effect differs for various types of cybercrime and it is 
not entirely clear which elements of social learning are most 
effective (Holt, 2009; Holt et al., 2010; Morris & Blackburn, 
2009; Skinner & Fream, 1997). Although many have argued 
that committing cybercrime is learned from friends, this 
has not been established. Knowledge can also be learned 
from unknown persons through the internet, for example, 
on forums or chat boxes (Chu et al., 2010; Holt & Kilger, 
2008; Holt el al., 2012; Hutchings & Holt, 2015; Hutchings, 
2014; Leukfeldt et al., 2017b; Skinner & Fream, 1997; Soudijn 
& Zegers, 2012). Criminal attitudes of friends – whether or 
not friends disapprove of delinquent behavior – are also of 
importance when it comes to cybercrime offending (Palesh, 
Saltzman & Koopman, 2004). The relation between the 
behavior of friends and one’s own behavior can be a result 
of a selection process whereby people prefer to select friends 
who exhibit the same behavior. This has not yet been studied 
Social learning, deviant friends
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for cybercrimes, presumably because longitudinal data is 
needed for this. Furthermore, it seems that both online and 
offline social contacts are of importance, but it is still unclear 
to what extent the effect of online and offline contacts varies 
(Holt, 2007; Holt & Bossler, 2014; Leukfeldt, Kleemans, & Stol, 
2016).
Social contacts seem to be an important factor for commit-
ting cybercrimes. Therefore, social contacts and selection 
processes have to be studied in greater depth. The various 
types of cyber-dependent crimes and cyber-enabled crimes 
should be included. Ideally, this needs to be done  objectively 
and based on longitudinal data. For example, by mapping 
entire networks at schools. As online ties seem to be just 
as important as offline ties, it is also important to identify 
the online network, for example, friends on social media or 
forums.
IT knowledge is an important factor in the ability of a person 
to commit cybercrimes. Personality traits, such as  self- control, 
can affect the extent to which someone is able learn the 
required skills. On the other hand, friends may assist in 
acquiring knowledge, and all sorts of ready-to-use tools and 
services can be found on forums (Holt et al., 2012; Leukfeldt 
et al., 2010; Odinot et al., 2016; Skibell, 2002; Sood & Enbody, 
2013).
It is unclear how much knowledge is needed to commit the 
different types of cybercrime. More insight into the role 
of IT knowledge is required. For example, how and where 
do cyber criminals gain their IT knowledge? Furthermore, 
IT  skills can be used both positively and negatively. How 
can you ensure that people who have these skills use them 
in a positive way? What are the differences between indi-




hat” hackers? Are there differences in the knowledge level 
needed to commit the various types of cyber-dependent 
crimes and cyber-enabled crimes?
Cybercrime does not require offenders and victims to con-
verge in time and space. Routine activities of offenders, how-
ever, might provide opportunities to commit cybercrimes. 
Although research on routine activities is mainly limited to 
the routines of victims, there are suggestions that particular 
online activities and victimization in the past are related to 
offending (Hu et al., 2013; Kerstens & Jansen, 2016; Morris, 
2011). Examples include gaming (Blackburn et al., 2014; Hu et 
al., 2013) and spending time in online communities (Hutchings 
& Clayton, 2016). Further, the timing of cyber-attacks appears 
to be linked to routine activities of offenders and victims 
(Maimon et al., 2013). In addition, traditional protective rou-
tine activities, like work, might also provide an opportunity 
to commit cybercrime (Randazzo et al., 2005; Willison, 2006).
It is important to understand whether offenders of  various 
forms of cyber- dependent crimes and cyber-enabled crimes 
consciously seek opportunities to commit crimes, or  whether 
they more or less come across opportunities to commit cyber-
crime by chance during their daily activities.
Is there a subculture in which committing cybercrimes is seen 
as normal? So-called hackers’ accounts may provide insight 
into hackers from the perspective of the offenders themselves 
(see, for example, Dizon, 2016; Turgeman-Goldschmidt, 2008; 
Steinmetz, 2015). Dutch hackers, for example, only label hack-
ing as illegal when the goal is financial gain (Van der Wagen 
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experimenting with technology, but certainly not as willingly 
and knowingly committing a crime. Various studies show 
neutralization techniques used by cybercriminals: denial of 
responsibility, denial of injury (no harm is done as long as 
you do not delete anything), denial of the victim (there is 
no victim, just an enemy), condemnation of the condemners 
(reference to the “real” criminals of the digital world), appeal 
to higher loyalties (e.g., I want to keep learning), self-fulfill-
ment (to do the impossible, even if someone else defines that 
as wrong) (Goode & Cruise, 2006; Hutchings & Clayton, 2016; 
Morris, 2011; Rogers, 1999; Turgeman-Goldschmidt, 2009, 
2011).
Further research is needed into the moral perceptions and 
neutralization techniques of cybercriminals. Is there a subcul-
ture in which committing cybercrimes is seen as something 
normal? And how does this influence young people who are 
experimenting with technology? Are traditional criminolog-
ical theories like Sutherland’s differential association theory 
or Sykes and Matza’s neutralization techniques applicable to 
the different types of cyber criminals?
Insight into the characteristics of criminal careers of cyber-
criminals and the processes that lead them to start, continue 
or stop such behavior is needed to develop effective interven-
tions. Traditional life course research focuses on the question 
of when and why people start and stop criminal behavior, 
often by looking at factors related to coming of age, such as 
getting a job, a house or marriage. Longitudinal studies are 
the most reliable way to study this. However, no such stud-
ies on criminal careers of cybercriminals exist (Holt & Bossler, 
2014).
Explorative studies indicate that hackers start at a very young 




are no differences in onset and persistence between tradi-
tional offenders and hackers (Bachmann, 2011; Chiesa et al., 
2008; Hutchings & Clayton, 2016; Ruiter & Bernaards, 2013; 
Sarma & Lamb, 2013; Steinmetz, 2015a). Moral development 
ensures that most eventually stop (Gordon, 1994, 2000; Van 
Beveren, 2001; Voiskounsky & Smyslova, 2003). Bachmann 
(2010) indeed shows that hackers hack more when they have 
no job because it takes a long time to execute these hacks and 
they have less to lose if they do not have a job. Some hackers 
also claim they would stop if they get a good job in the IT 
sector, where they can use their skills legally (Chiesa et al., 
2008). However, traditional protective factors such as work 
and school, especially in the IT sector, may offer the opportu-
nity to commit cybercrimes (Leukfeldt et al., 2010; Randazzo 
et al., 2005; Turgeman-Goldschmidt, 2008, 2011b; Willison, 
2006; Xu, Hu & Zhang, 2013). Finally, a study into the criminal 
careers of offenders involved in cyber-enabled crimes shows 
that fraudsters that use the internet to commit their crime 
are more likely to have a criminal record than fraudsters who 
only commit their crime offline (respectively 18% and 11%). 
Fewer offenders who were prosecuted for making online 
threats, however, had a criminal record compared to offend-
ers who were prosecuted for making offline threats (respec-
tively 19% and 31%) (Montoya et al., 2013). This implies that, 
when it comes to threats, the internet enables more “ordi-
nary”  people to make threats. With regard to fraud, it can 
be said that existing fraudsters are expanding their criminal 
activities to the online world (see Motoya et al., 2013).
Research into why people start, continue or stop committing 
cybercrimes is scarce. Are criminal careers of cybercriminals 
similar to those of offline offenders? And are cybercriminals 
specialists or all-rounders? Further, it is not known whether 
we are dealing with “new” offenders, or “old” offenders 
who have expanded their territory to the online world. This 
is due to the limitations of samples used in current studies 
and to the fact that there are only a few studies that make 
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a statistical comparison with traditional crimes. Longitudinal 
studies are completely lacking.
Furthermore, studies indicate that offenders not only com-
mit cybercrimes, that traditional offenders sometimes switch 
to cybercrimes or that offline networks are used to recruit 
 people who have the right skills to commit cybercrimes. 
Finally, traditional crimes increasingly have a digital compo-
nent. This is in line with the Koop’s observation (2017) that 
offline and online situations are merging more and more. 
This is referred to “the onlife world.” It is important to gain 
more insight into exactly how cybercrimes and conventional 
crimes are intertwined. This intertwinement of the offline 
and online world with regard to careers of cybercrime 





Rutger Leukfeldt, Christianne de Poot, Maite Verhoeven, 
Edward Kleemans, Anita Lavorgna
When we look at characteristics of individuals within cyber-
criminal networks, a combination can be seen of, on the 
one hand, a new type of offender and, on the other hand, 
offenders who have been active in the criminal world for a 
long time (Leukfeldt et al., 2016, 2017a, 2017b; Odinot et al., 
2016). The new type of offenders includes criminals that were 
not previously found among traditional organized criminal 
groups, namely young offenders, offenders with an IT back-
ground, and ill or disabled offenders who barely leave their 
homes. Odinot et al. (2016) conclude that the characteristics 
of offenders that are important in the offline world, such as 
age, physical health, and social behavior, are less important 
within cybercriminal networks.
Research on “new players” in organized crime is needed. 
Traditional data sources have limitations that are further 
complicated by the anonymity the internet provides, which 
makes it difficult to identify (all) members of cybercriminal 
networks. When analyzing police files, for example, offend-
ers who have not been detected by law enforcement agen-
cies are not included in analyses. Alternative online data 
sources and advanced data collection methods are needed 
to gain insight into these offenders. One way of doing this 
is to analyze criminal activity on forums. Another way is col-
laborating with cybersecurity companies that monitor parts 




Traditionally, social ties play an important role in the origins 
and growth processes of criminal networks (e.g., Bouchard 
& Morselli, 2014; Kleemans & De Poot, 2008). Social ties are 
strongly clustered and limited to, for example, a region or 
country. However, in the online world there are no geograph-
ical distances to be bridged in order to come into contact with 
other offenders; distance, location and time are no longer 
limiting factors. Compared to the offline world, it is relatively 
easy for offenders to be part of different criminal networks 
and to step in and out of collaborations with just a few clicks. 
Indeed, studies show that the process to get into a criminal 
group may be different in the digital world (e.g., Soudijn & 
Zegers, 2012; Yip et al., 2012). Newcomers on forums, for 
example, are able to come into contact with existing mem-
bers quickly and are able to get a more central position rela-
tively quickly. In contrast to physical networks, actors with a 
central position within networks seem to be less important. 
Apparently, in a virtual setting it is easier to connect to others 
than in a physical setting.
Several recent studies show that cybercriminal networks use 
offline social ties as well as online meeting places to come 
into contact with suitable co-offenders (Leukfeldt, 2014; 
Leuk feldt et al., 2016, 2017a; Odinot et al., 2016). The recruit-
ment process can be divided into two main categories. The 
first main category is the traditional model: offline social 
contacts. Two subcategories can be distinguished: growth 
entirely through offline social contacts, and offline social 
contacts as a base and online meeting places to recruit spe-
cialists. The second main category is growth based on online 
meeting places. Again, two subcategories can be distin-
guished: growth entirely through online meeting places, and 
online meeting places as a base and offline social contacts 
for much needed local contacts (for example, money mules 
which are used to obscure the financial trail from victims to 
Origin and growth
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core members of criminal networks). Networks that are able 
to make full use of the capabilities of these online meeting 
places seem to be able to expand their criminal capabilities 
quickly and are able to become inter national players in a rel-
ative small group (Leukfeldt et al., 2016, 2017a, 2017b).
Digitization provides new pathways into criminal networks. 
The effects of these new pathways on the structure and 
duration of criminal networks and criminal careers of indi-
vidual members, for example, remain unclear. Examples of 
prolonged interaction on online forums can be seen. Core 
members of cybercriminal networks spend much of their 
time in chat rooms, meeting like-minded people and building 
relationships. With a whole new generation of digital natives 
coming up, it is likely that online social ties will become 
increasingly important in the development of cybercriminal 
networks. Research on differences and similarities between 
offline and online social ties, and their impact on the origins 
and growth processes and the functioning of cybercriminal 
networks, is needed.
Furthermore, countries that were part of the former Soviet 
Union are often seen as hotspots for cybercriminal networks 
(Bhattacharjee, 2011; Jones, 2010; Kshetri, 2013). Allegedly, 
many offenders or groups of offenders, including the highly 
skilled malware developers, operate from within these coun-
tries. Further research is needed into the involvement of 
Russian and East European cybercriminals and the factors 
that play a role in their alleged over-representation.
The internet offers an opportunity structure for decentralized 
flexible networks of offenders who distribute work based on 
knowledge and skills (see, for example, Odinot et al., 2016). 
Case studies suggest that within cybercriminal networks the 




of bridge builder, diminishes (Decary-Hétu & Dupont, 2012; 
Decary-Hétu et al., 2012; Holt & Smirnova, 2014; Lu et al., 
2010; Motoyama et al., 2013; Soudijn & Monsma, 2012; Yip et 
al., 2012). However, recent studies also show that cybercrim-
inal networks still have dependency relationships (Leukfeldt 
et al., 2016, 2017a, 2017b). Most of the networks have a more 
or less stable group of core members who commit crimes 
together over an extended period of time. The core members 
of these networks often know each other from the offline 
world and recruit only a few specialists through online meet-
ing places. A minority of networks could be labeled as ad 
hoc networks that were forged in online meeting places to 
execute one-off attacks.
An important question is how relevant the function of cen-
tral nodes within cybercriminal networks will remain in the 
future. There is little research on the structure of cybercrim-
inal networks, but studies do suggest that such nodes are 
diminishing in importance. What is more important for cyber-
criminals: the establishment of ad hoc  alliances to quickly 
carry out attacks or finding a reliable group of accomplices 
to work with for a longer period of time? A   better under-
standing of the organizational structure of cybercriminal 
networks will provide clues for opportunities to disrupt 
these networks. On which actors (and processes) do net-
works rely the most? Which actors are most difficult to find 
and replace?
Physical meeting places, such as a bar or clubhouse, play an 
important role within the origins and growth processes of 
criminal networks. These meeting places are of great impor-
tance when explaining crime, because their venues provide 
structure and continuity, and ensure that newcomers are able 
to connect with other members and become part of exist-
ing criminal networks (Felson, 2003, 2006). The internet has 
Cybercriminal meeting places
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its own criminal meeting places, for example, forums where 
hackers meet to exchange information or make plans to carry 
out attacks. To a certain extent, forums facilitate the origin 
and growth of cybercriminal networks. Indeed, in order to 
carry out successful attacks, offenders with all sorts of knowl-
edge and skills are needed. Some criminals are, for example, 
good at developing malware, but do not have the skills to 
launder the money made from their criminal activities.
Members of cybercriminal networks spend much of their time 
in criminal and non-criminal chat rooms and forums, where 
they meet like-minded people and build relationships. Little 
is known about involvement mechanisms into cybercriminal 
networks and the role of forums in the origins and growth 
processes. For example, we do not know how curious loners 
who hang out on non-criminal forums end up in cybercrimi-
nal networks. Research into these involvement mechanisms 
is needed to better understand the origins and growth pro-
cesses of cybercriminal networks.
Existing offline cultures, communities and social relation-
ships appear to be important in online forums (Ablon et al., 
2014). Aspiring members of invite-only forums, for example, 
have to have existing contacts with members of that forum: 
either online ties gained on other forums or chat channels, 
or offline ties that originated in the members’ community 
or social cluster. Furthermore, not all members of the net-
work are connected to one another (Holt & Smirnova, 2014). 
It is therefore questionable whether using forums removes 
the restrictions of the social network. New members have 
to already know someone in that particular criminal world. 
There is a lack of insight into the process of how aspiring 
cybercriminals enter open and closed forums.
Furthermore, it is necessary to conduct in-depth research on 
interactions on forums. These analyzes must go beyond the 
existing social network analyzes and descriptions of forums. 
For example, little is known about the type of offenders that 
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uses forums (from novice to expert), the number of attacks 
that originate from forums and how important forums are 
for the functioning of cybercriminal networks. Are forums, 
for example, only important for making initial contacts? Do 
subsequent interactions mainly take place outside the forum? 
And are forums populated by petty thieves who buy credit 
card credentials and curious young people who experiment 
with cybercriminal tools? Or are we dealing with profession-
als who systematically attack organizations in constantly 
changing compositions?
Most of the cybercriminal meeting places can be seen as 
criminal markets where all sorts of goods and services are 
traded. Different categories can be distinguished: (1)  stolen 
data including credit card credentials, bank accounts details 
and PayPal accounts, and identity documents; (2) cybercrimi-
nal tools, such as, phishing kits, malware, botnets and DDoS 
attacks; (3) services such as escrow services that can be used 
to make secure transactions, exchangers that convert  virtual 
money into real money, and bullet proof hosting; and (4) ille-
gal trade in the more traditional illegal goods, such as, drugs, 
medication and weapons.
Although some researchers have attempted to estimate the 
size of specific online cybercrime markets (Dhanjani & Rios, 
2008; Holtz et al., 2009), this seems to be an impossible task 
due to the variety of goods on offer, the uncertainty about 
differences between asking price and sale price (deals are 
usually closed outside the forum), and the supply of fake or 
outdated data and tools (Herley & Florencio, 2009; Holt & 
Smirnova, 2014). Despite all of this, it is important to under-
stand the scale of online cybercrime markets, and to better 
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Finding reliable vendors is of great importance for the func-
tioning of online criminal meeting places. There are sev-
eral mechanisms to ensure that reliable members can be 
found. Firstly, having the appropriate reputation is required 
for entering closed forums. To access these forums, poten-
tial members are screened by administrators (or members 
appointed by the administrator) and they have to prove that 
they are active cybercriminals, for example, by providing sto-
len credit card data or a tutorial they have written (Ablon et 
al., 2014; Holt et al., 2015; Lusthaus, 2012; Soudijn & Zegers, 
2012; Yip et al., 2013). Furthermore, members can earn all 
sorts of statuses that can be used to separate the reliable from 
the unreliable members. Sellers, for example, can get the sta-
tus of “trusted seller” after getting good reviews from the 
official reviewers of the forum (Chu et al., 2010; Decary-Hétu 
& Dupont, 2013; Holt, 2013; Holt & Smirnova, 2014; Holt & 
Lampke, 2010; Lu et al., 2010; Motoyama et al., 2013; Peretti, 
2008; Soudijn & Monsma, 2012; Yip et al., 2013). Finally, many 
forums have rating systems in which buyers rate and review 
the data, tools and services they purchased (Ablon et al., 
2014; Chu et al., 2010; Dupont et al., 2016; Decary-Hétu & 
Dupont, 2012, 2013; Holt, 2013; Holt & Smirnova, 2014; Holt et 
al., 2015; Herley & Florencio, 2009; Lusthaus, 2012; Motoyama 
et al., 2011; Soudijn & Zegers, 2012; Wehinger, 2011; Yip et al., 
2013). Other members now know that they are dealing with 
someone that sells the good stuff. The reviews and status are 
related to the online names used by members. These online 
handles, therefore, are of great importance to cybercriminals 
(Lusthaus, 2012).
The true importance of rating systems for the functioning of 
online meeting places is unclear. Rating systems rely heavily 
on the willingness of buyers to make reviews (Holt et al., 
2015); if members do not give reviews, the good and bad 




that members of online meeting places do not always give 
reviews, therefore, the role of, for example, administrators 
who are able to award certain members a “high degree of 
reliability” status might be more decisive for determining 
reliability of members than review systems (Decary-Hétu & 
Dupont, 2013; Dupont et al., 2016).
As finding reliable members is of great importance for the 
functioning of online meeting places and, therefore, cyber-
criminal networks, research is needed into which actors or 
mechanisms have the most impact on trust in online meet-
ing places. Experiments on online meeting places can be 
done to find out exactly how offenders establish trust, how 
these processes can be disrupted and what the displacement 
effects of interventions are.
Little is known about the involvement of traditional organ-
ized crime groups in the execution of cybercrimes. While an 
increasing number of publications note that the internet is a 
tool exploited by organized crime groups (see, among oth-
ers, Europol 2014, 2016), it seems they do not pay enough 
attention to the modalities and the extent to which tradi-
tional organized crime groups are exploiting some of the new 
opportunities provided by the internet to commit crimes, for 
instance, crimes in which the internet is used as a primary 
crime facilitator but is not necessarily an inherent part of 
the criminal activity. Indeed, apart from anecdotal evidence, 
there is still little research on which types of groups use the 
internet, to what degree, and for what types of activities 
(Lavorgna, 2015). Lavorgna and Sergi (2014) explored this 
question with regard to different Italian organized crime 
groups, and suggested that mafia-type groups operating in 
their traditional territories are not (yet) significantly exploit-
ing the internet, probably because the social opportunity 
structure they rely on does not match very well with internet 
Involvement of traditional organized crime groups
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usage and apparently it still works well enough that they do 
not feel the need to make any relevant changes. However, 
when mafia groups are operating in non-traditional territo-
ries, they are more open and quick to embrace new criminal 
opportunities, including online opportunities.
Empirical research on the involvement of traditional organ-
ized crime groups in the execution of cybercrimes is  needed. 
Specifically, it is important to carry out comparative research 
considering differences (and explanations about these dif-
ferences) on the diverse use of IT by different types of organ-
ized crime groups and in different territories.
Organized crime groups that are involved in trafficking activ-
ities have largely benefited from criminal opportunities the 
internet provides. In this case, the internet has affected crimi-
nal markets in a significant way, for instance, boosting certain 
trafficking flows more than others and opening the way for 
criminal niche markets. Moreover, where a structured crimi-
nal association was once needed because a minimum degree 
of sophistication was necessary in order to commit certain 
crimes, some organizational layers now do not seem to be 
fundamental anymore: very loose organizations are involved 
in serious trafficking activities (Lavorgna, 2015).
While recent research extensively focused on some of the 
internet-facilitated criminal markets (first and foremost, 
drug markets) other criminal activities have so far been over-
looked. Furthermore, new research is needed to look specif-
ically at the social dynamics regulating the choice of these 
organized crime groups to move (at least partially) online.
Cybercrime is often seen as something global that only takes 
place in the virtual world. However, the offline world can 
certainly still be important. Research shows that members of 
Offline side of cybercrime
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some cybercriminal networks are located in the same offline 
social cluster – even when executing cybercriminal attacks 
all over the world (Broadhurst et al., 2014; Leukfeldt et al., 
2016, 2017a, 2017b; Odinot et al., 2016). Working with  trusted 
acquaintances from the offline world could potentially have 
many advantages over working with potentially unreliable 
actors from all over the world who are only know by their 
online handle. Furthermore, not all cybercriminals only com-
mit cybercrimes; studies show that cybercriminals are often 
also involved in all sorts of offline crimes (Hollinger, 1988; 
Leukfeldt et al., 2016, 2017b; Ruiter & Bernaards, 2013; Van 
der Broek et al., 2016).
Future research should also explicitly focus on the offline side 
of cybercrime. By only focusing on the new online aspect of 
the crime, a limited and distorted view of cybercriminals and 
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It is clear that cybercrime is a growing problem and that many 
people are being victimized. The latest figures from Statistics 
Netherlands, for example, show that in one year, 5.1 percent 
of the Dutch population fell victim to hacking, 3.5 percent fell 
victim to online consumer fraud, and 0.6 percent fell victim 
to identity fraud (CBS, 2016). In comparison, the highest per-
centages of victimization from traditional crimes in the Neth-
erlands were bicycle theft (4%), burglary or attempted bur-
glary (3%) and violence (2.2%) (CBS, 2016). Furthermore, prior 
victim studies show that individuals suffer from many more 
types of cybercrime: 16.7 percent of Dutch internet users fell 
victim to malware (with financial damages), 1.1 percent fell 
victim to cyberstalking and 0.7  percent fell victim to cyber 
threat (Domenie et al., 2013).
Although it is clear that victimization from some types of 
cybercrime is high, we fail to understand the nature, extent 
and impact of all types of cyber-dependent crimes and 
cyber-enabled crimes. Only a few specific types of cyber-
crime are measured annually. This makes it impossible to 
determine trends in cybercrime.
In order to gain insight into the entire spectrum of cyber-
crimes, it is necessary to develop instruments to periodically 
measure the nature, extent and impact of victimization of 
cybercrime. Victim surveys are generally used to gain insight 
into the nature and extent of victimization. However, these 
traditional victim surveys, which have been carried out over 
Nature, extent and impact on individuals
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decades, have little room to add extra questions related to 
cybercrime victimization. Because of this, for example, we 
know that hacking is one of the most common crimes in 
the Netherlands, but insight into the nature of these hack-
ing incidents and the consequences for victims and society 
is lacking. Furthermore, the extent to which this method is 
suitable for measuring victimization of, for instance, mal-
ware is not known. Therefore, research into new methods 
and datasets is needed. Analyzing respondents’ computers, 
for example, could provide a better picture of malware infec-
tions. It may also provide insight into the security measures 
installed by victims (see, for example, Anderson & Agarwal, 
2010). Furthermore, computer log files can be used to study 
real rather than reported respondent behavior.
Knowledge about the nature, extent and impact of victimiza-
tion among organizations is scarce. Virtually no research has 
been done into organization-specific cyber risks (Hernandez-
Castro & Boiten, 2014; McGuire & Dowling, 2013; Schaper & 
Weber, 2012; Veenstra et al., 2015). Many estimates about 
victimization are made based on isolated data streams and 
case studies that are extrapolated to the whole of society. 
So far, estimates vary and are under as well as over reported 
(Anderson et al., 2013).
Recent Dutch research shows that small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), as well as freelancers, are active internet 
users who are highly dependent on IT systems. The majority of 
entrepreneurs take various technical measures against cyber-
crime (such as virus scanners or protecting Wi-Fi networks). 
Nevertheless, 28.5 percent of Dutch SMEs and 27.9  percent 
of one-man businesses fell victim to one or more forms of 
cybercrime (Veenstra et al., 2015). The extent of cybercrime 
victimization is comparable to that of traditional crimes 
among organizations (see, for example WODC, 2 011). The 
Nature, extent and impact on organizations
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most  common forms of cybercrime that entrepreneurs face 
are malware, internet fraud, phishing and hacking (Veenstra 
et al., 2015).
Research methods must be developed that can be used 
to systematically gain insight into the nature, extent and 
impact of victimization among organizations. This is needed 
to understand victimization and the economic and social 
consequences. Future studies should include characteristics, 
such as size of the organization and the sector of the organ-
ization, and factors, such as, cybersecurity measures and 
security training among employees.
Besides traditional victim surveys, online data or data from 
internal networks at organizations can be used to determine 
the nature and extent of cybercrime victimization and to 
map user behavior. Furthermore, data from hosting provid-
ers, for example, can be used to gain insight into the state 
of an organization’s security and contamination of its con-
tent on servers (see, for example, the work of Van Eeten et 
al. (2010) on spam levels at ISPs). Finally, data from organ-
izations, such as the Dutch National Cyber Security Center 
(NCSC), or hotlines, can be used to gain more insight into 
cyber-related incidents.
Even though the prevalence of cybercrime has increased rap-
idly and cybercrime has become part of everyday life of citi-
zens during the last two decades, a major problem remains: 
victims of cybercrime are far less likely to report their vic-
timization to the police than victims of traditional crime are. 
This is true for both individuals (13.4%, Domenie et al., 2013) 
and organizations (12.8%, Veenstra et al., 2015). However, it 
is of great importance that victims report these crimes to the 
police. Not only is this often necessary for starting a criminal 




and types of crimes that are committed. Therefore, increas-
ing victims’ willingness to report crimes leads to more police 
investigations (and in turn to a better chance of catching the 
criminal) and a better understanding for developing coun-
termeasures against the most common crimes, or crimes with 
the highest impact.
Currently, there is a lack of insight into the economic factors 
(costs and benefits) and the psychological factors (emotions 
and attitudes) that influence willingness to report crimes 
by individuals as well as organizations. Therefore, research 
into factors that influence the willingness to report crime is 
needed. It is important to differentiate between the various 
types of victims (e.g., individual citizens, small and medi-
um-sized  enterprises, international organizations) and dif-
ferent types of cybercrime.
The risk of falling victim to cybercrime is related to various 
personal and environmental characteristics. Dutch studies 
on victimization risk factors for various cybercrimes, such as 
hacking, phishing, online threats, online fraud and identity 
fraud, show that young people, people who spend a lot of 
time online, and impulsive people are more at risk of falling 
victim to most of these cybercrimes (Domenie et al., 2012; 
Jansen & Leukfeldt 2015; Jansen & Leukfeldt, 2016; Jansen et 
al., 2013; Leukfeldt 2014, 2015; Paulissen & Van Wilsem, 2015; 
Van Wilsem, 2011, 2013). Furthermore, researchers found 
that openness, extroversion, lack of self-control, thrill seek-
ing, impulsivity and neuroticism are related to an increased 
chance of becoming a cybercrime victim (Halevi, Lewis & 
Memon, 2013; Modic & Leah, 2011; Ngo & Paternoster, 2011).
Routine activities of victims also seem to be related to 
cybercrime victimization. Examples of routine activities that 
lead to increased risk include being online more, opening 
Risk factors
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 attachments from unknown sources, clicking on pop-ups, 
internet banking, online purchases, and not  having up-to-
date antivirus software (Anderson, 2006; Bossler & Holt, 2009; 
Choi, 2008; Hutchings & Hayes, 2009; Jansen &  Leukfeldt, 
2016; Leukfeldt, 2014; Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016; Leukfeldt, 2014; 
Leukfeldt, 2015; Ngo & Paternoster, 2011; Pratt & Holtfreter 
Reisig, 2010; Van Wilsem, 2013).
Although quite a lot of research has been done on risk fac-
tors related to cybercrime victimization, current studies have 
some major limitations. Studies have different outcomes 
due to differences in their scope, for example, the types of 
cybercrimes included and the number of variables measured, 
and methodological limitations (use of small and/or non-rep-
resentative samples). Although some psychological factors, 
such as self-control, have been studied a lot, other potential 
relevant factors, such as the Big Five personality traits (open-
ness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agree-
ableness and neuroticism) have not been explored in depth.
One of the most pressing issues is the fact that longitudi-
nal studies are basically non-existent. As a consequence, the 
current studies based on cross-sectional data do not provide 
any insight into cause and effect relations (preventive meas-
ures can reduce risk, but victimization can also prompt vic-
tims to put preventive measures in place). Longitudinal data 
can also be used to study the impact of cybercrime victim-
ization on online behavior, online risk perception and the 
risk of repeat victimization. This fits within a life course per-
spective on victimization, in which victimization is seen as an 
event that could lead to modification of behavior, which in 
turn has implications for future risks. Future studies should 
also look at whether specific groups, such as impulsive peo-
ple, respond differently to victimization than the average 




Future research should take advantage of new methods and 
data sources. Actual behavior of end users can, for exam-
ple, be studied using log files. This means that data must be 
collected from systems in homes, at the workplace, hosting 
providers, ISPs, or other relevant organizations.
Humans are often described as the weakest link in cyber-
security. Therefore, it is important that people behave safely 
online (Shillair et al., 2015), for example, by being careful 
when sharing information online, by avoiding  potentially dan-
gerous websites, by using strong passwords and by  keeping 
operating systems and other software up to date.
However, research into the correlation between attitudes 
and behavior in the field of privacy and online behavior has 
shown that although most people see cybersecurity as some-
thing important (Madden & Rainie, 2015) their actual behav-
ior does not correspond to their attitudes (Spiekermann, et 
al., 2001; Broenink et al., 2009). Security measures are often 
viewed as a hygiene factor (Hassenzahl et al., 2010; IBM, 
2014). i.e., as something that should be in order and that may 
potentially have negative results, but also something that 
should not bother you (Bada, Sasse & Nurse, 2015). In the con-
text of an organization, the resilience of employees is also 
influenced by organizational factors such as corporate culture 
(Herath & Rao, 2009; Sohrabi Safa & Von Solms, 2016), man-
agement style (Soomro et al., 2016), human resource manage-
ment (Wall, 2013) and budget (Bohme, 2010).
Researchers therefore have looked at how users can be moti-
vated to take protective measures. It appears that confidence 
in their own ability to apply measures, the perceived effective-
ness of a measure, and highlighting one’s control or respon-
sibility over online security is of great importance (Boehmer 
et al., 2015; Jansen & Van Schaik, 2016; Shillair et al., 2015). 
Resilience
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Other studies focus on the more emotional side of preven-
tion: making users aware, or perhaps afraid, of the possible 
consequences of disclosing information. However, this seems 
to have little positive effect on users (e.g., Kumaraguru, 2010; 
Purkait, 2012; Tembe et al., 2014; West, 2008). Also, psycho-
logical mechanisms, such as personal relevance, optimism bias 
and adverse effects, are important when it comes to target 
hardening. In general, it has been established that most peo-
ple pay attention to warnings or other messages when these 
are perceived to be personally relevant, and that they do 
not pay attention to messages that lack personal relevance 
(Sagarin et al., 2002).
Research into the effectiveness of cybercrime and cyber-
security measures and training programs shows that making 
end users more resilient decreased the number of success-
ful cyber-attacks (Bowen et al., 2012; Pattinson et al., 2012; 
Sheng et al., 2010). However, other studies have had differ-
ent outcomes and the long-term effects of training programs 
are unknown (Caputo et al., 2014; Kumaraguru et al., 2009; 
Purkait, 2012). Bulee et al. (2016) find evidence that measures 
lose their effectiveness over time.
Insight into the long-term effects of technological measures 
is also lacking. Measures, such as blacklists or filters, have 
downsides, such as false positives (Hong, 2012; Leukfeldt et 
al., 2009; Ludl et al., 2007; Stol et al., 2008; Stol et al., 2009). 
Research into security indicators, such as the SSL lock or cer-
tificates, show that end users do not understand them or 
ignore them (Jakobsson, 2007; Dhamija et al., 2006). Further-
more, criminals can manipulate these indicators (Claessens 
et al., 2002).
Because of the lack of longitudinal studies, it is unclear what 
factors contribute to the long-term effectiveness of tech-
nical security measures, awareness campaigns, education 
and training programs. Future research into this will help 
increase the effectiveness of measures, training programs 
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and interventions on the various types of cyber- dependent 
and cyber-enabled crimes.
An important question is how security tools and  processes 
can be designed in such a way that users are motivated and 
encouraged to act safely without interfering too much in 
their daily routines (also referred to as nudging and persua-
sive technologies). Key to answering these kinds of ques-
tions are the assets that need to be secure, the security tools 
and processes implemented to secure these assets, and the 
relation with psychological needs such as control, autonomy, 
efficiency and social constructs. IT systems at organizations 
seem particularly suitable for measuring  actual behavior and 
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Various organizations are involved in tackling crime. Boutel-
lier (2005) uses a soccer metaphor to illustrate this. In the front 
line, citizens play a role. They have to behave safely and take 
precautions. In the midfield, organizations, such as housing 
associations and schools, play an important role. Although 
security is not the primary task of such organizations, they 
do have an important role in creating a secure environment. 
Organizations whose primary goal is to make society safer 
form the defense line. Examples include law enforcement 
agencies and private security companies.
The soccer metaphor can also be used with regard to the 
fight against cybercrime (see, for example, Boes & Leukfeldt, 
2017; De Pauw & Leukfeldt, 2012). In the case of cybercrime, 
end users form the defense line. They themselves are able 
to secure their computer. In the midfield, ISPs, hosting com-
panies and social media platforms play an important role. 
The defense consists of law enforcement agencies and, per-
haps even more than with traditional forms of crime, private 
security companies and public-private partnerships.
End users are important when it comes to keeping our digi-





risks is important. For example, they have to be careful about 
sharing private information, they have to avoid dangerous 
online activities, use strong passwords and keep software up 
to date. Next, end users can take on various roles when it 
comes to protecting one another against cybercrimes (as the 
partner, educator, teacher, colleague, etc.). In addition, end 
users are an important source of information for law enforce-
ment agencies. The information that law enforcement agen-
cies have will only improve if victims or bystanders report 
cybercrimes. Finally, citizens are involved in various initiatives 
in which they are trying to create a safe digital society (e.g., 
activist groups and hotlines).
Chapter 4 lists what we already know about resilience and 
increasing the willingness to report cybercrime. Therefore, 
only some main aspects are discussed here. An important 
issue regarding end users and security measures is to find 
out how security measures and tools can be designed in such 
a way that users are motivated and encouraged to act safely 
without the measures interfering too much in their daily rou-
tines. It is known that the effects of security training pro-
grams decrease over time. Future research should, therefore, 
focus on identifying factors contributing to the long-term 
effectiveness of training programs.
With regard to the willingness to report cybercrimes, it is 
important to study the economic factors (costs  and bene-
fits) and psychological factors (emotions and attitudes) that 
influence willingness to report crimes by individuals as well 
as organizations. It is important to differentiate between 
different type of victims (e.g., individual citizens, small and 
medium-sized  enterprises, international organizations) and 
different types of cybercrime.
With regard to online citizen initiatives, the following ques-
tions arise: What kind of initiatives exist at the moment and 
what are the legal and ethical limitations of such initiatives?
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Traditionally, ISPs and hosting providers have played an 
important role as so-called super controllers. Super control-
lers are able to influence the behavior of others, for example, 
by using contractual governance, or by implementing secu-
rity measures to protect their customers (for example, Wall, 
2007). In recent years, new super controllers have arisen. 
Examples include Facebook, Google, Apple and Microsoft. 
Furthermore, the role of these organizations in the fight 
against cybercrime is also increasing. Besides the reactive 
assistance of law enforcement agencies in criminal investiga-
tions, these parties are increasingly being held accountable 
for their social responsibility in the prevention of illegal or 
unwanted statements (resulting in, for example, so-called 
voluntary notice and take-down policies).
Important research questions are: what role and what social 
or other responsibilities do super controllers have in the fight 
against the different types of cybercrime? Does the current 
legal framework for ISPs provide adequate safeguards for 
super controllers and enough space for detecting and com-
bating cybercrime? And what impact does the  public-private 
partnership between law enforcement agencies and super 
controllers have on the fundamental rights of citizens?
We live in a digitized society. The criminal justice system has 
to adapt to this. Studies into the functioning of the criminal 
justice system with regard to handling cybercrimes show that, 
apart from a few specialized teams, the police do not have 
the knowledge and skills to handle cybercrime cases effec-
tively. But perhaps other factors also play a role, for exam-
ple, capacity and organizational culture. Furthermore, it is 
questionable whether courts and lawyers are able to critically 
New super controllers
The criminal justice system
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assess the digital investigative methods used by the police 
(Leukfeldt et al., 2013; Stol et al., 2013).
The extent to which the criminal justice system is able to 
adapt to the ongoing digitization is not known. How effec-
tive is our criminal justice system in dealing with the various 
types of cybercrime? What are major bottlenecks and how 
can they be solved?
Because of the international character of many cybercrimes, 
criminal investigations into cybercrime require a rethinking 
of international legal frameworks. Traditional frameworks of 
collaboration between states are based on territorial sover-
eignty. Starting points are, therefore, often physical bound-
aries and a static location of evidence. However, the internet 
has fundamentally different characteristics. An important 
question is whether the current framework for international 
collaboration, as a link to national law enforcement, is still 
sufficiently equipped to guarantee the enforcement of the 
law (see, for example, Koops & Goodwin, 2014).
Nowadays, information can move rapidly, or may even be 
located at different places at the same time. Traditionally, 
criminal investigations are strictly linked to physical borders. 
As a result, at the moment, criminal investigations sometimes 
have to be stopped when it is not clear whether the IT infra-
structure where the information is located, is in the Neth-
erlands. In certain situations, new Dutch laws make it pos-
sible to continue parts of the criminal investigation, even if 
information is located outside the Netherlands. However, this 
problem applies to many European countries.
At the moment there is no clear picture of how other coun-
tries deal with the problems related to the international char-
acter of the various types of cybercrime. Are there explicit 
International criminal investigations
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investigative powers? Can the problem be solved through 
interpreting existing legal framework, or are other countries 
also developing new laws?
Another challenge relates to the patchwork of legal frame-
works for collaboration with ISPs. The increasing digitization 
and development of cloud services, for example, makes access 
to the information that ISPs have vital for effective cyber-
crime investigations. ISPs are often located in either one or 
a small number of countries, whilst their users are located 
in many more countries. Also, ISPs and cloud computing ser-
vices do not necessarily store user information in the country 
where the users are located. This creates situations where the 
cybercrime suspect is in one country, information on the sus-
pect in the other, and the ISP who has to provide the informa-
tion in yet another country. The current patchwork of rules 
on whether or not ISPs should provide information to law 
enforcement agencies does not constitute a transparent sys-
tem. Collaboration is often on a voluntary basis, allowing ISPs 
to set their own rules about the conditions under which they 
cooperate with the criminal investigation.
Because of the high dependency of law enforcement agen-
cies on ISP information, the development of a clear and effec-
tive legal framework is essential. What should a (European) 
framework for collaboration between ISPs and law enforce-
ment agencies look like?
Only a few specific forms of cybercrime are individually 
recorded in the official record systems of the Dutch justice 
system. Cyber-enabled crimes in particular, tend to get lost 
in registration systems. Internet fraud, for example, is often 
recorded as fraud and not as cybercrime (Leukfeldt et al., 
2010). As a consequence, a clear overview of the number of 




missing. Further, there is still a lack of knowledge about the 
characteristics of cybercrime offenders and whether or not 
cybercriminals differ from perpetrators of traditional crimes 
(see Chapter 4).
Currently, we do not know how effective criminal investiga-
tion and prosecution is when it comes to the various types 
of cybercrime. Future research should not only map potential 
interventions and actors who should play a role in execut-
ing these interventions, but also evaluate the effectiveness 
of these interventions on the different types of cybercrime. 
Juvenile offenders deserve extra attention. What interven-
tion methods are there that would make a first offender 
stop?
From a rational choice perspective, it is important to note that 
it pays to commit cybercrimes, perhaps even more than tradi-
tional crime (Boes & Leukfeldt, 2017; Holt, Smirnova, & Chua, 
2016; Hutchings & Clayton, 2016; Lovet, 2006). Furthermore, 
the probability of detection and thus punishment is very low, 
probably lower than for traditional crime (Li, 2008; Rogers, 
2001; Young et al., 2007). At the moment, it is not known 
how cybercriminals can be deterred, i.e., how we can make 
sure that the perceived costs are higher than the perceived 
benefits. Experimental research with honeypots shows that 
warning banners are not a guaranteed deterrent for hacking 
(Maimon et al., 2014). Criminal investigation and prosecution 
do seem to have an effect (Png & Wang, 2007), but it depends 
on the offender’s motivation and level of risky behavior 
( Konradt et al., 2016), and only rational acting offenders who 
are aware of the possible consequences are affected by the 
probability of detection (Guitton, 2012).
Cybercrime is lucrative because the risk of being caught is 
low and the potential profit is high. Research on deterrence 
must be extended so that it becomes clear whether it makes 
sense to increase the probability of detection. This requires 
knowledge on the rational choices that cybercriminals make 
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and their motives for committing cybercrime. The different 
types of cybercrime and the motives related to them should 
be taken into account.
In addition to criminal investigations, other measures, such as 
victim notification, disruption, and damage mitigation, can 
be taken to make it harder for cybercriminals to carry out 
their attacks or to limit the impact of attacks. For example, 
software developers, owners of IT infrastructures or victims 
who do not yet know they are victims can be informed, so 
they can take measures to limit further damage. Furthermore, 
law enforcement agencies together with private parties that 
manage IT infrastructures are able to create barriers to stop 
offenders from using these IT services.
A recent example of this alternative approach is the NoMore-
Ransom platform, a collaboration between the Dutch police, 
Europol and private security companies [nomoreransom.org], 
that aims to help citizens and organizations who are victim of 
so-called ransomware (using malware, cybercriminals encrypt 
files on the victims’ computers. The victims have to pay to 
be able to use their data again.) The platform offers decryp-
tion tools and advice on how and where to report this crime. 
Also, potential victims are informed about what to do if they 
become a victim of ransomware.
Research into the possibilities of alternative interventions is 
limited. Important questions are: what intervention strate-
gies are being used at the moment? Are they effective in 
preventing negative effects on victims and deterring poten-
tial offenders from committing cybercrimes? Which actors 
are involved in these alternative interventions and how do 
they work in practice? Is there a legal framework for existing 
public-private partnerships?
Alternatives for law enforcement
62
RESEARCH AGENDA
Hutchings and Holt (2016) provide an overview of interven-
tions aimed at the disruption of online criminal markets. The 
authors make a distinction between interventions against the 
act, the actor and in the marketplace. When it comes to inter-
ventions against the act, measures are primarily aimed at dis-
rupting opportunity structures. In order to do this, insight 
into so-called “crime scripts” – all the steps needed to commit 
a particular crime – is needed (see Hancock & Laycock, 2010; 
Hutchings & Holt, 2015; Leukfeldt et al., 2017b). Examples 
of such measures include monitoring banking transactions 
and anti-money laundering measures (e.g., discouraging 
providers of e-currencies to get involved in criminal activi-
ties) (Hutchings & Holt, 2016; Leukfeldt, 2016). Furthermore, 
criminal infrastructures, such as botnets, can be taken down. 
Botnets, networks of infected machines, are almost always a 
part of cybercriminal activities (Mielke & Chen, 2008; Schless 
& Vranken, 2013; Silva et al., 2012; Van der Wagen & Pieters, 
2015). Measures against the actor focus on disrupting trust 
between offenders who are active on online meeting places 
(see also Chapter 5). This is called “lemonizing the market” 
(Herley & Florencio, 2009; Hoe et al., 2012). This can be done 
by so-called sybil and/or slander attacks with “fictitious” 
(unreliable) sellers or buyers who are used to create distrust 
in the market. The idea is that an uncertain market situation 
scares motivated offenders away. Finally, measures against 
the marketplace are all about taking down the online market 
places (see Hutchings & Holt, 2016).
Although a number of possible intervention strategies 
are described in the literature, research is needed into the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of these measures. Are there 
displacement effects? And which public and private actors 
should be involved?
Interventions aimed at criminal markets
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The use of large data sets from multiple sources for criminal 
investigations is being subjected to increasing scrutiny (for 
example, Koops, 2009; De Vries & Smilda, 2014). The main 
problem in the Netherlands is that the criminal justice frame-
work for the application of special investigative powers and 
the use of data within law enforcement agencies is governed 
by two different legal regimes that do not fit together (the 
Dutch Code of Civil Procedure (Wetboek van Strafvordering) 
and the Dutch Police Data Act (Wet politie gegevens). In short, 
when data enters the police organization legally in the con-
text of a criminal investigation, this information can be used 
for anything. Hence, the increasing power of big data analy-
sis may affect the privacy of suspects.
Relevant questions are whether more synergy is needed 
between the two legislative frameworks related to crim-
inal investigations (the Dutch Code of Civil and the Dutch 
Police Data Act) and how this can be achieved. Furthermore, 
it is important to critically study the use of big data by law 
enforcement agencies. Indeed, big data also has disadvan-
tages. Cause and effect relationships remain unclear and 
there will always be false positives and false negatives. Can 
big data be used effectively by law enforcement agencies in 
the fight against cybercrime?
Private organizations, including private security firms and 
detective agencies, are partners to the police when it comes 
to the fight against cybercrime. With the ongoing digitiza-
tion of society, organizations that have large amounts of data 
about people, such as Google, Facebook, banks and eBay, 





Public-private partnerships in the fight against crime can 
be effective, but they also raise questions. Private parties 
proactively providing large data sets to the police (or other 
law enforcement parties) in order to detect cybercrime raises 
questions about privacy and data protection. Other relevant 
research questions on public-private partnerships are: what 
kind of information is exchanged between the police and 
their partners? How is this information being exchanged? 
How does this relate to the current legal framework (espe-
cially with regard to forensic principles)?
Technological developments that are currently still in their 
infancy will have an impact on security and law enforcement 
in the near future. For example, the further digitization of 
motor vehicles and household products (internet of things). 
Society and law enforcement must prepare for this. Research 
questions in this context are: what digital developments will 
almost certainly affect security? What consequences does 
this have for law enforcement? How can parties involved in 





 THE HUMAN 
 FACTOR  EXAMINED: 
 DIRECTIONS FOR 
 FUTURE RESEARCH
Rutger Leukfeldt
Although research has been done into the human factor in 
cybercrime and cybersecurity, insight into the various aspects 
of these forms of crime is lacking. This is mainly due to the 
fact that the studies that have been done are often explora-
tory in nature, suffer from significant methodological limita-
tions and focus on just a few of the many types of cybercrime.
This chapter describes the main findings of Chapter 4 to 7, 
where the state-of-the-art and key research questions are 
described related to offenders, victims and tackling crimes or 
incidents in which IT is the target or where IT plays a major 
role in the realization of the offense. Only the main lines for 
future research on the human factor in cybercrime and cyber-
security are presented in this chapter.
LONGITUDINAL RESEARCH
One of the most pressing issues in research into the human 
factor in cybercrime and cybersecurity is the lack of longitu-
dinal studies. The majority of studies that have been done 





single point in time). Longitudinal studies make comparisons 
over time and provide insight into cause-and-effect relation-
ships. Longitudinal studies are needed into offenders (e.g., 
criminal careers, psychological characteristics), victims (e.g., 
online behavior, online risk perception and the risk of repeat 
victimization) and tackling cybercrime (e.g., the long-term 
effects of interventions, training programs and awareness 
campaigns).
THE OFFLINE SIDE OF CYBERCRIME
Cybercrime and cybersecurity is often seen as something 
global that takes place only in the virtual world. However, 
the offline world is still important when it comes to cyber-
crime. Research, for example, shows that offenders some-
times not only commit cybercrimes but are also involved 
in offline scams or drug smuggling; traditional offenders 
sometimes switch to cybercrimes; and offline networks are 
used to recruit people who have the right skills to commit 
cybercrimes. Indeed, the online world and offline world are 
intertwined. Future research should also explicitly focus on 
the offline side of cybercrime. Focusing on the new online 
aspect of the crime alone creates a limited and distorted view 
of cybercrime, cybersecurity incidents, cybercriminals and 
cybercriminal networks.
THE DARK FIGURE OF CYBERCRIME
For all types of crime, there is a dark figure. Existing data from 
organizations within the criminal justice system do not reflect 
the extent of crime. The dark figure includes offending, vic-
timization and the extent of the damage. The dark figure for 
cybercrimes is considerably higher than that of traditional 
crimes. Because of this, basic information about, for example, 
the nature and extent of offending and victimization in the 
entire spectrum of cybercrimes is lacking, the long-term con-
sequences for victims are not known, and is it impossible to 
determine trends. Research is needed to determine whether 
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traditional methods, such as victim and offender surveys, can 
be used to study the dark figure for cybercrimes. Also, the 
usability of new research methods and online and offline 
datasets have to be tested.
THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF CYBERCRIMES
There are various types of crimes or incidents in which IT is 
the target or where IT plays a major role in the realization 
of the offense. For future studies, the different types of 
crime and the characteristics related to them must be taken 
into account. The motivations and choices of offenders, and 
opportunities for interventions related to motivations may 
vary considerably for an individual hacker who hacks for rec-
ognition, a script kiddie who typically uses tools created by 
others without overseeing the consequences of their actions, 
and traditional organized crime groups that hire IT specialists 
to commit cyber-attacks. Future studies, therefore, should 
include the various types of crimes or incidents in which IT is 
the target or where IT plays a major role in the realization of 
the offense.
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF CYBERCRIME OFFENDERS
It is not known whether cybercriminals are a new type of 
offender, or whether they are traditional offenders on new 
turf. There are several exploratory studies on the characteris-
tics of cybercriminals, but these often have significant meth-
odological limitations and/or focus on a limited number of 
cybercrimes. We therefore do not know exactly which charac-
teristics are significant, and it is still unclear exactly how these 
characteristics are related and interact with, for example, IT 
knowledge or other specific characteristics of committing 
cybercrimes. Longitudinal studies that include the various 
forms of cybercrime are needed to map both demographic 




THE SOCIAL AND CRIMINAL NETWORKS OF 
CYBERCRIME OFFENDERS
In addition to demographic and psychological characteristics 
of offenders, their social and criminal networks are related to 
criminal behavior. Explorative studies show that this applies 
to cybercrime as well. The knowledge required to commit 
cybercrimes can, for example, be learned from friends. Knowl-
edge can also be gained from online networks, for example, 
on forums or chat channels. It seems that both online and 
offline social contacts are important, but exactly how these 
social contacts are related to committing cybercrime remains 
unclear. Longitudinal studies into offline, as well as online, 
social networks are needed to gain insight into the role of 
social networks in relation to cyber-dependent crimes and 
cyber-enabled crimes.
THE CRIMINAL CAREERS OF CYBERCRIME OFFENDERS
Understanding the characteristics of the criminal careers 
of cybercriminals and the processes that prompt them to 
start, continue or stop such behavior is relevant to devel-
oping effective prevention measures. Traditional life course 
research focuses on the question of when people start and 
stop criminal behavior, often by looking at factors  associated 
with coming of age, such as a job, a house or a partner. The 
most reliable way to gain insight into this is through longitu-
dinal studies. Currently, there are no longitudinal studies into 
the criminal careers of offenders involved in the various types 
of cybercrime.
CHARACTERISTICS OF CYBERCRIMINAL NETWORKS
Traditionally, social ties play an important role in the origins 
and growth processes of criminal networks. These social ties 
are strongly clustered and, therefore, limited to, for example, 
a region or country. However, in the online world, geographic 
distances do not need to be bridged in order to come into 
contact with other offenders. Digitization has ensured that 
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the pathways into criminal networks are somewhat differ-
ent than before. However, its effects on the structure and 
duration of criminal networks are still unknown. Insight into 
this will provide pointers for possibilities for disrupting these 
criminal networks.
THE ROLE OF CRIMINAL ONLINE MEETING PLACES
In the formation of offline criminal networks, physi-
cal  meeting places, such as a cafe, play an important role. 
The  location provides structure and continuity:  newcomers 
are able to establish links with existing members, enter exist-
ing criminal networks or create new criminal networks. The 
internet has its own criminal meeting places, such as forums 
where cybercriminals meet, buy technical tools or make plans 
to carry out attacks. In-depth research into interactions on 
forums is needed. These analyzes must go beyond the cur-
rent social network analyzes and descriptions of forums. For 
example, there is a lack of insight into the number of attacks 
that originate from forums and how forums influence the 
functioning of cybercriminal networks.
FINDING RELIABLE CO­OFFENDERS
Finding reliable co-offenders to create criminal networks or 
to buy or sell cybercriminal tools and services are of great 
importance for the functioning of online meeting places. 
Online meeting places have several mechanisms that ensure 
that reliable members can be found, for example, there are 
different statuses and rating systems. However, the question 
is to what extent these rating systems are actually important 
for the members of a forum. Rating systems, for example, rely 
heavily on the willingness of buyers to give a review. How-
ever, buyers often do not cooperate well enough for review 
systems to work properly. Research is therefore needed into 
the actors and mechanisms that have the most impact on 
trust in online meeting places.
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THE WILLINGNESS TO REPORT CYBERCRIMES
Victims of cybercrime (individuals as well as organizations) 
are far less likely to report their victimization to the police 
than victims of traditional crime. Currently, there is a lack 
of insight into the economic factors (costs and benefits) and 
psychological factors (emotions and attitudes) that influence 
willingness to report crimes on the part of individuals as well 
as organizations. Therefore, research into factors that influ-
ence willingness to report crime is needed. It is important 
to differentiate between the different types of victims (e.g., 
individual citizens, small and medium-sized enter prises, and 
international organizations) and different types of cyber-
crime.
FACTORS RELATED TO AN INCREASED CHANCE OF 
CYBERCRIME VICTIMIZATION
Young people, people who spent a lot of time online and 
impulsive people are more at risk of falling victim to cyber-
crime. It also appears that openness, extroversion, lack of 
self-control, sensation seeking, impulsiveness, and neuroti-
cism are related to the risk of becoming a cybercrime victim. 
Finally, certain online activities, such as downloading and 
untargeted surfing, are related to victimization. Although 
quite a lot of research has been done on risk factors  related 
to cybercrime victimization, there is no knowledge about the 
cause-effect relationships because of the use of cross-sec-
tional data (preventive measures, for example, can reduce 
risk, but victimization also prompts victims to put preventive 
measures in place). Longitudinal studies that include back-
ground characteristics, psychological characteristics, as well 
as online behavior are needed to untangle these factors. 
Future studies should also include the entire range of cyber-
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THE RESILIENCE OF END USERS
The resilience of end users, individuals as well as employees, 
seems to be an important protective factor in the preven-
tion of cybercrime victimization. Researchers, therefore, have 
looked at how users can be motivated to take protective 
measures. For example, it turns out that the perceived effec-
tiveness of a measure and highlighting one’s responsibility 
for online security is important. Because there is no longitudi-
nal research, insight into cause-effect relationships is lacking. 
In addition, studies indicate that the effectiveness of meas-
ures decreases over time. An important question is therefore 
how hardware and software can be designed in such a way 
that users are motivated and encouraged to act safely with-
out interfering too much in their daily routines.
THE FUNCTIONING OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN 
A DIGITIZED SOCIETY
Studies into the functioning of the criminal justice system with 
regard to handling cybercrimes show that the police – apart 
from a few specialized teams – do not have the knowledge 
or skills required to effectively handle cybercrime cases. How 
effective is our criminal justice system in dealing with the var-
ious kinds of cybercrime? Furthermore, digitization is contin-
uing at a rapid pace. Technological developments that are 
still in their infancy at the moment will have an impact on the 
criminal justice system and  society in the near future. Society 
and the criminal justice system have to prepare accordingly. 
What digital developments will almost certainly affect secu-
rity? And what are the consequences for the criminal justice 
system?
EFFECTIVE INTERVENTIONS
Cybercrime is lucrative because the risk of being caught is low 




cybercriminals has to be done in order to find out whether 
it makes sense to increase the probability of detection. This 
requires knowledge about the  rational choices of cybercrim-
inals, their motives for committing cybercrimes and their 
business models. There is currently no knowledge about the 
effectiveness of specific intervention measures aimed at pre-
venting first-time offending or recidivism involving the vari-
ous types of cybercrime and related motives.
EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE INTERVENTIONS
In addition to criminal investigations into cybercriminals, var-
ious actors can be used to make it harder for cyber criminals 
to carry out their attacks. For example, software develop-
ers, owners of IT infrastructures or victims who are not yet 
aware that they are victims can be informed so they can take 
measures to limit further damage. Also, IT structures used 
by cybercriminals can be disrupted. Despite the importance 
of alternative interventions, research on this topic is limited. 
Currently, there is no insight into effective interventions 
aimed at cyber-dependent crimes and cyber-enabled crimes.
THE ROLE OF PRIVATE PARTIES
Public-private partnerships in the fight against crime can be 
effective, but they also raise questions. Private parties proac-
tive sharing large data sets with law enforcement agencies in 
the context of detecting cybercrime raises questions about 
privacy and personal data protection. What kind of informa-
tion is currently being exchanged between private parties 
and the police? How is this information being exchanged? 
How does this relate to the current legal framework (espe-
cially with regard to forensic principles)? Another challenge 
relates to the patchwork of legal regimes for collaboration 
with ISPs. Due to the high dependency that law enforcement 
agencies have on the information that ISPs have, the devel-
opment of a clear and effective legal framework is essential. 
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What should a legal framework for collaboration between 
ISPs and law enforcement agencies look like?
THE ROLE OF SUPER CONTROLLERS
Traditionally, ISPs and hosting providers have played an 
important role as super controllers. Super controllers are able 
to influence the behavior of others in order to reduce the 
risk of incidents, for example, by contractual governance or 
by installing security measures. Over the years, new super 
controllers have arisen. Examples include Facebook, Google, 
Apple and Microsoft. What role do these super controllers 
have in the fight against cybercrime? Does the current legal 
framework for ISPs provide sufficient safeguards for super 
controllers and is there enough space for cooperation with 
law enforcement agencies in the fight against cybercrime? 
And what effect on the fundamental rights of citizens do 
public-private partnerships between super controllers and 
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